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 An analysis of any particular decision of the International Court of Justice sometimes 
misses broader, cross-cutting themes that animate the Court’s jurisprudence. This essay, prepared 
for an April 2013 symposium at the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, in Florence, explores a few of the themes that emerged from the Court’s 2012 
jurisprudence. With respect to sources of law, the Court’s decisions confirm the enduring 
relevance of non-treaty sources of law, the enduring attraction of multilateral treaties for 
ascertaining customary rules, and the emergence of jus cogens as feature of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, though perhaps more dazzling in theory than in practical application. Further, the 
Court’s decisions highlight the continuing structural difficulty for international law and 
institutions in coping with redress for harm to individuals. In light of these themes, the essay 
concludes by suggesting some implications for the future codification and progressive 
development of international law.   
I. Enduring Relevance of Customary International Law and General Principles of Law 
as Sources of International Law 
The modern network of multilateral and bilateral treaties that span all sectors of 
international law can lead one to assume that when disputes arise between States there will 
inevitably be an international agreement relevant to the matter. Yet a survey of the Court’s 2012 
jurisprudence readily demonstrates the enduring relevance of customary international law and 
general principles of law.  
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In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State,1 there existed no treaty between Germany and 
Italy identifying the nature and scope of the immunity to be accorded to governments under 
national law. Germany was a party to the European Convention on State Immunity (European 
Convention),2 but Italy was not. Neither State had ratified the U.N. Convention on the 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (U.N. Convention)3 nor, in any event, had 
that treaty entered into force. Consequently, the Court decided the case using rules of customary 
international law,4 which resulted in an extensive analysis of national laws,  judicial decisions on 
immunity and, as discussed in Section II, treaties as evidence of State practice. 
Similarly, in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo,5 the Court had previously found that the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) had violated Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights6 and Article 6 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights.7 Yet 
neither those treaties nor any other treaty between the Republic of Guinea and the DRC 
contained a provision on the type and extent of remedy appropriate for the violations of human 
rights or on the evidence necessary to support a remedy. As a result, the Court had to probe the 
practice of a number of international courts and tribunals, including its own prior decisions and 
those of regional human rights courts and ad hoc claims commissions, to decide on issues such 
as the proper heads of damage, the nature and quantification of non-material injury, whether 
material damage may be awarded based on equitable considerations, whether compensation may 
be awarded for lost income, and whether post-judgment interest is appropriate.8 The Court’s 
reliance on such a wide range of jurisprudence from other tribunals might be viewed as a 
counter-argument to concerns about the ‘fragmentation’ of international law,9 demonstrating the 
                                                          
1 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger v It: Greece intervening), Judgment (3 February), [2012] ICJ, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf. 
2 European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, 1495 UNTS 182, ETS No 74. 
3 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2 December 2004, UN Doc 
A/RES/59/38, Annex (16 December 2004). 
4 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1), para 55. 
5 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v Dem Rep Congo), Judgment (19 June), [2012] ICJ para 3, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/103/17044.pdf. 
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 9, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
7 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art 6, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 
(1982). 
8 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (n 5), paras 13–15, 18, 24, 33, 40, 49, 56.  
9 See International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law:  Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
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ability of international courts to engage in a cooperative trans-institutional dialogue.10 Indeed, 
Judge Greenwood in his Declaration, after noting the Court’s use of jurisprudence from other 
courts and tribunals, declared: 
International law is not a series of fragmented specialist and self-contained bodies of law, 
each of which functions in isolation from the others; it is a single, unified system of law 
and each international court can, and should, draw on the jurisprudence of other 
international courts and tribunals, even though it is not bound necessarily to come to the 
same conclusions.11 
In the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case, the question of what maritime features were 
capable of being sovereign territory was decided on the basis of customary international law.12 
The further question of which State was sovereign over those features also turned on application 
of customary international law to the acquisition of territory, including the principle of uti 
possidetis juris13 and the concept of effectivités through acts à titre de souverain.14 Although 
Colombia and Nicaragua’s 1928 Treaty (the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty) was a starting point for 
considering which State was sovereign, the Court ultimately concluded that the treaty did not 
conclusively answer that question because it did not clearly indicate which maritime features fell 
within the San Andrés Archipelago, thus necessitating reliance on other law.15 Judge Abraham 
took the Court to task in his separate opinion for abandoning the treaty, arguing that ‘difficulty’ 
in interpreting a treaty is not a basis for setting it aside,16 but his concern apparently gained no 
traction with the Court. As for delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two States, 
Colombia was not a party to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, so the Court applied 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), as corrected UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (11 August 2006)). 
10 See Ole Kristian Fauchald and André NollKaemper (eds), The Practice of International and National Courts and 
the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (Hart Publishing 2012) 8; Suzannah Linton and Firew Kebede Tiba, 
‘The International Judge in an Age of Multiple International Courts and Tribunals’ (2009) 9 Chi J Intl L 407. 
11 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (n 5), Declaration of Judge Greenwood para 8, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/103/17050.pdf. 
12 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar v Colom), Judgment (19 November), [2012] ICJ para 26, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/17164.pdf. 
13 ibid para 57–65.  
14 ibid paras 66–84. 
15 ibid para 56. 




customary international law,17 including ‘the principle that the land dominates the sea through 
the projection of the coasts or the coastal fronts’18 
 Notwithstanding the enduring relevance of customary international law and general 
principles of law, it must also be said that where the Court has a binding treaty instrument before 
it that is directly relevant to the dispute, the Court gravitates to that instrument as the relevant 
source of law. In Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, Belgium placed before the Court 
arguments based upon both the U.N. Convention against Torture and customary international 
law.19 As discussed further below, the Court set aside the customary international law arguments, 
purportedly on jurisdictional grounds, and instead based its decision on the multilateral treaty 
ratified by both Belgium and Senegal.20 Likewise, in the Advisory Opinion on Judgment No. 
2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization, the Court focused 
on interpreting and applying international instruments, principally the statute of the 
administrative tribunal whose decision was being challenged,21 as well as the underlying 
employment contract.22 Even so, in the course of its decision, the Court also relied upon certain 
general principles of international law, such as the principle favoring equality of access to 
present a claim or defense before a tribunal.23  
II. Enduring Attraction of Multilateral Treaties for Ascertaining Customary Rules 
In determining the meaning of customary international law, the Court was often attracted 
to and relied upon longstanding multilateral treaty instruments as an expression of such norms, 
even though the treaties themselves were not binding upon the Parties before it. In doing so, the 
Court would sometimes note that the Parties themselves viewed the relevant treaty provisions as 
reflecting customary international law.24 Conversely, in some instances the Court noted the ‘long 
                                                          
17 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (n 12), para 137. 
18 ibid para 140. 
19 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg v Sen), Judgment (20 July), [2012] ICJ para 1, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf. 
20 ibid para 55. 
21 See, e.g., Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
Advisory Opinion (1 February), [2012] ICJ para 21, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/146/16871.pdf. 
22 ibid para 76. 
23 ibid paras 37, 39. 
24 See, e.g., Territorial and Maritime Dispute (n 12), para 138. 
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and difficult discussions’ that led to a recent multilateral treaty provision, suggesting that the 
provision – at least in its entirety – may not reflect settled customary international law.25 
For example, in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the Court’s discussion of the 
‘territorial tort’ exception to sovereign immunity begins with a detailed consideration of the text 
of both Article 11 of the European Convention and Article 12 of the U.N. Convention on 
sovereign immunities, both of which contained a version of such an exception.26 The Court 
consulted those same conventions when considering whether immunity should be denied where 
the claims concerned serious violations of human rights law or the law of armed conflict,27 
whether Italy’s last resort argument was credible,28 and whether Italy was obliged to enforce 
decisions rendered in Greek courts.29 Judge Koroma in his separate opinion discussed the 
negotiating history of the U.N. Convention to demonstrate that a territorial tort exception could 
not cover acta jure imperii by armed forces during armed conflict.30 
In the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case, the Court used the provisions of Articles 74 
and 83 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) as reflective of customary 
international law on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.31 
Further, the Court held that LOSC Article 76(1), which defines the continental shelf as extending 
to the outer edge of the continental margin, constituted customary international law, though it 
saw no need to address the customary status of the remaining paragraphs of that article. 
Likewise, the Court used LOSC Article 121 when considering the legal régime of islands under 
customary international law.32 Judge Keith in his Declaration focused considerably on the 
drafting history of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, regarding it as directly relevant to 
the methodology adopted by the Court in its maritime delimitation.33  
                                                          
25 See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1), paras 115–17. 
26 ibid paras 64–69. 
27 ibid para 89. 
28 ibid para 101. 
29 ibid para 129. 
30 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1), Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma paras 6–7, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16885.pdf. 
31 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (n 12), paras 137–39.  
32 ibid. 




Although engaged in a customary international law analysis,  the Court decided not to 
delimit the continental shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles in part 
because the outer limits of Nicaragua’s continental shelf had not yet been established through a 
Nicaraguan submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf under LOSC 
Article 76.34 As Judge Donoghue observed in her separate opinion, even though customary 
international law applied to the delimitation of the continental shelf as between Nicaragua and 
Colombia, the Court apparently refrained from such delimitation based upon Nicaragua’s failure 
to pursue a procedural  mechanism of a treaty, despite the fact Colombia – a non-party – had not 
yet become a party to that treaty.35  One wonders if the result would have been different if 
Colombia had been the Applicant in the case or at least had not opposed delimitation beyond 200 
nautical miles. 
III. Jus Cogens –  Dazzling in Theory; Disappearing in Practice 
Since its establishment almost seventy years ago, the International Court has only 
occasionally referred to jus cogens, which is defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties as a rule ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole 
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.’36 Yet jus cogens 
featured in not just one but two of the Court’s cases in 2012.  
The Court expressly declared in Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite that ‘the prohibition 
of torture is part of customary international law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus 
cogens).’37  In so doing, the Court suggested the key components for identifying a peremptory 
norm: widespread practice of States refraining from the proscribed conduct; opinio juris by those 
States; codification of the prohibition in numerous international instruments of universal 
application; incorporation of the prohibition into the national law of almost all States; and regular 
                                                          
34 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (n 12), paras 126–29. 
35 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (n 12), Separate Opinion of Judge Donoghue para 26, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/17174.pdf. 
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100, para. 190 (June 27); Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (D.R.C. v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 6, 32, para. 64 (Feb. 
3); Application of the Convention on Genocide (Bosnia-Herz. V. Serbia & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 161, para. 161 (Feb. 
26). 
37 Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (n 19), para 99. 
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condemnation of such conduct in national and international fora.38 The Court’s approach 
suggests that the identification of a norm as jus cogens is much like the identification of any 
customary rule of international law, albeit perhaps with an even greater degree of State practice. 
Though the Court refrained from expressly deciding as much in Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State, it was willing to entertain the possibility that ‘the rules of the law of armed conflict which 
prohibit the murder of civilians in occupied territory, the deportation of civilian inhabitants to 
slave labour and the deportation of prisoners of war to slave labour are rules of jus cogens.’39 
Even so, jus cogens had no real practical effect in the decisions where it arose. In 
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, the status of the prohibition on state-sponsored torture as 
jus cogens did not mean that Senegal’s obligation to prosecute or extradite existed in the period 
prior to Senegal’s adherence to the Convention against Torture.40 In other words, while Chad and 
its President Hissène Habré were prohibited in the 1980s from engaging in state-sponsored 
torture, the status of that prohibition as jus cogens did not by itself impose an obligation upon 
Senegal to prosecute or extradite Habré when the ousted former President subsequently arrived 
in that country; rather, the obligation only arose once the Convention entered into force for 
Senegal. Indeed, in that case nothing seemed to turn on the status of the norm as jus cogens.  
Likewise, in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the Court accepted arguendo that 
many of the allegations in Italian courts amounted to violations of jus cogens.41 Still, the Court 
concluded that rules on the scope and extent of jurisdiction and immunity in national courts are 
not themselves derogations from jus cogens and that the severity of a violation of international 
law is not germane to the existence of immunity from national jurisdiction; accordingly, 
customary international law on State immunity is not affected even if the claims before national 
courts relate to a State’s alleged violations of jus cogens.42 Similar reasoning precluded the 
denial of immunity notwithstanding allegations of serious violations of international human 
rights law or the international law of armed conflict.43 That outcome was troubling to Judge 
Cançado Trindade, who lamented the ‘abyss separating my own position from that of the Court’s 
                                                          
38 ibid. 
39 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1), para 93. 
40 Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (n 19), para 100. 
41 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1), para 93. 
42 ibid para 97. 
43 ibid para 91. 
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majority’ and that ‘without the primacy of jus cogens, international law would have a grim 
future.’44 Judge Cançado Trindade criticized not only the Court but also States for ‘olympically 
ignor[ing] the incidence of jus cogens’ when they drafted the U.N. Convention.45   
Yet given that the content and effects of jus cogens turns, presumably, in large part on the 
views of the Court as a whole and on the views of States, the overall effect of Judge Cançado 
Trindade’s lengthy dissenting opinion may be to establish that his views on jus cogens are 
idiosyncratic. Even the other two dissenting judges did not follow Judge Cançado Trindade’s 
reasoning. Judge Yusuf was clear that the core issue was not that ‘each time there is a claim for 
reparation of breaches of international humanitarian law or human rights, the domestic courts of 
the State where the breaches had been committed, are entitled to set aside the immunity of the 
State responsible for such breaches.’46 Doing so might ‘result in countless lawsuits that may 
overwhelm both the judicial system of the State where the claims are made and the governmental 
machinery of the responsible State.’47 Similarly, Italy’s ad hoc judge, Giorgio Gaja, found that 
‘the nature of the obligation under international law which is at the origin of the claim does not 
per se provide sufficient evidence that jurisdiction may be exercised over foreign States in case 
of a claim for reparation for the breach of an obligation under a peremptory norm wherever 
committed.’48 Both Judge Yusuf’s and Judge Gaja’s positions were more nuanced than that of 
Judge Cançado Trindade, viewing the severity of the violation as one factor that might support 
application of an exception to immunity. 
IV. For Harm to Persons, Contemporary Rules But Traditional Processes  
Although international law seeks to protect persons from serious harms by governments, 
it often provides weak and inefficient mechanisms for them to pursue claims, and that fact was 
evident in a few of the Court’s 2012 decisions. As Judge Cançado Trindade observed in one of 
his separate opinions, although ‘States have lost the monopoly of international legal personality a 
                                                          
44 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade para 288, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16891.pdf. 
45 ibid para 224. 
46 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf para 54, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16893.pdf. 
47 ibid. 
48 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Gaja para 11, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16895.pdf (emphasis added). 
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long time ago,’ the ‘insufficiency, if not artificiality, of the exclusively inter-State outlook of the 
procedures before the ICJ has become manifest, in the light of the very nature of some of the 
contentious cases submitted to it … [and] by the exercise of its advisory function ….’49 Three of 
the Court’s 2012 decisions provide different vantage points for this issue: private claims 
advanced in national courts to vindicate a violation of international law run into immunities;50 a 
private claim advanced before an international administrative tribunal to vindicate a violation of 
international law;51 and private claims advanced through diplomatic protection by the 
individual’s State to vindicate a violation of international law.52  
In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, of course, may be seen the phenomenon of 
private claims based on international law being advanced in national courts. In that instance, 
there was common ground between the two States and the Court that internationally wrongful 
acts were committed against Italian nationals by German military forces during the latter part of 
World War II. Indeed, the Court observed that ‘Germany has fully acknowledged the “untold 
suffering inflicted on Italian men and women in particular during massacres, and on former 
Italian military internees.”’53 As a result, the arguments presented by Italian nationals in Italian 
courts for violations of international law on the merits had considerable force. Even so, the 
Court’s judgment closed the door on such claims, due to the immunity to which the Government 
of Germany was entitled.  
The recognition of such immunity is not surprising, especially in the context of the 
governmental conduct at issue – action by military units in time of war – that falls squarely 
within the realm of acta jure imperii.54 Nevertheless, that result made for a disturbing 
juxtaposition between the general agreement that wrongful acts had occurred and the lack of a 
forum where the victims could vindicate their claims. Although the Court said it was both 
surprised and regretful that Germany to date had denied compensation to the claimants, the Court 
found ‘no basis in the State practice from which customary international law is derived that 
                                                          
49 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (n 5), Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade paras 11–12, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/103/17046.pdf. 
50 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1). 
51 Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO (n 21).  
52 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (n 5). 
53 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1), para 52. 
54 ibid para 60. 
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international law makes the entitlement of a State to immunity dependent upon the existence of 
effective alternative means of securing redress.’55 The most the Court could do was to note that 
the claims of Italian nationals ‘could be the subject of further negotiation involving the two 
States concerned, with a view to resolving the issue.’56 
Judge Bennouna voted in favor of the Court’s judgment, but explained that his support 
was predicated on an expectation that Germany would meet its responsibility.57 For Judge 
Bennouna, where a State acknowledges its responsibility for unlawful acts and fails to then 
provide a remedy, it loses the benefit of immunity in foreign national jurisdictions.58 Thus, ‘if 
Germany were to close all doors to such settlement . . . then the question of lifting its immunity 
before foreign courts in respect of those same wrongful acts could legitimately be raised 
again.’59 Judge Yusuf was of the same mind, though his displeasure with the Court’s failure to 
think through the legal implications of all the doors being closed prompted him to dissent.60  The 
same concern animated Judge Cançado Trindade’s dissent, which essentially took the position 
that a breach of international law and the ensuing compliance with the duty of reparation was 
part of an indissoluble whole; they should not conceptually be differentiated as primary and 
secondary obligations.61 Further, that indissoluble whole could not be broken by a claim of State 
immunity, a point he reiterated in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo.62 Nevertheless, his view did not attract 
support from the Court as a whole. 
The phenomenon of a private claim being advanced before an international 
administrative tribunal to vindicate a violation of international law arose in the Advisory Opinion 
on Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO.  There, the Court was placed in 
the awkward position of essentially deciding the validity of the claim by Ms. Saez García against 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), even though Ms. García was 
                                                          
55 ibid para 101. 
56 ibid para 104. 
57 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 1), Separate Opinion of Judge Bennouna para 13, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16889.pdf. 
58 ibid para 15. 
59 ibid para 25. 
60 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf (n 46), para 17. 
61 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade (n 44), para 294. 
62 Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade (n 49), para 35. 
11 
 
precluded from communicating directly with the Court.63 Article XII of the Statute of the 
Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization (ILOAT) allowed IFAD to 
challenge decisions rendered by the ILOAT in Ms. García’s favor by referring the matter to the 
Court, but provided no means for direct participation by Ms. García.64 Instead, the Court’s 
Registrar informed Ms. García that any communications that she wished to convey to the Court 
had to be done through IFAD, the entity that allegedly harmed her.65 To help ameliorate the 
problem, the Registrar requested that the General Counsel of IFAD ‘provide to the Court, 
without any control being exercised over their content, any communications from Ms Saez 
García relating to the request for an advisory opinion that she might wish to submit to it.’66 Even 
so, the process encountered difficulties, including an initial failure of IFAD to transmit to the 
Court Ms. García’s communications.67 
The peculiarity and even perversity of a victim having to communicate with a court only 
through the alleged perpetrator of the harm was not lost on the judges. The Court appears to have 
seriously considered declining to issue the advisory opinion, due to concerns regarding 
inequality of access to, and inequality in the proceedings before, the Court.68  Among other 
things, the Court noted Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and associated comments by the Human Rights Committee.69 Both Judges Cançado Trindade 
and Greenwood commented on this concern, with the former suggesting an erosion of the ‘inter-
State outlook’ of adjudication at the ICJ70 and the latter asserting that problems existed both 
from granting only IFAD the ability to initiate an ICJ proceeding and from then denying Ms. 
García direct access to the Court.71 For Judge Greenwood, ‘the inequality of access which exists 
at present cannot be allowed to persist into the future.’72 Ultimately, the Court did answer the 
                                                          
63 See Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO (n 21), Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado 
Trindade para 20, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/146/16873.pdf. 
64 Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO (n 21), para 1. 
65 ibid para 10. 
66 ibid para 12. 
67 ibid para 46. 
68 ibid paras 33–48. 
69 ibid para 39. 
70 Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade (n 63), paras 76–81. 
71 Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO (n 21), Declaration of Judge Greenwood paras 3–4, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/146/16875.pdf. 
72 ibid para 3. 
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question placed before it,73 but only in a manner that favored Ms. García; one wonders whether 
an advisory opinion disfavoring the person would have issued given the Court’s concerns about 
an inequality of arms. 
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo demonstrates the phenomenon of a State using diplomatic 
protection to advance a claim on behalf of one of its nationals to vindicate a violation of 
international law. As Judge Greenwood observed at the outset of his declaration, although 
Guinea brought the case to the Court, it was ‘in substance about the human rights of Mr. 
Diallo.’74 There is no express indication in the judgment that Mr. Diallo had any difficulty in 
providing information to his government for the purpose of securing compensation for the 
deprivation of his human rights. At the same time, the decision makes clear that Guinea 
produced no specific evidence of non-material injury to Mr. Diallo,75 produced no evidence 
about Mr. Diallo’s inability to transport personal property from the DRC,76 produced no 
evidence of high-value items in Mr. Diallo’s apartment,77 produced no evidence regarding 
alleged assets in bank accounts,78 and produced no evidence of Mr. Diallo’s monthly earnings 
that were lost due to his detention or expulsion.79 The failure to prove such losses largely 
explains why the Court, after 14 years of litigation involving three different phases, awarded 
compensation of just US$95,000 – an amount that no doubt was dwarfed by the litigation 
expenses of the two States.80 
One cannot definitively say that the amount of compensation awarded would have been 
any different if Mr. Diallo was able to represent himself directly before the Court. Yet it is 
probably the case that an aggrieved individual is motivated to present his case more zealously 
than is his government; indeed, a government’s interest in pursuing litigation involving a 
neighboring State, with whom it has a complex political relationship, is not the same as the 
interest of an individual, especially one who likely intends to have no future relationship with 
                                                          
73 Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO (n 21), para 100. 
74 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (n 5), Declaration of Judge Greenwood para 1, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/103/17050.pdf. 
75 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (n 5), para 19. 
76 ibid para 31. 
77 ibid para 34. 
78 ibid para 35. 
79 ibid paras 41, 49. 
80 ibid para 56. 
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that other State. Had Mr. Diallo, through his own lawyers, appeared before the Court, it is 
possible that different tactical choices would have been made: they might have submitted more 
than just a single pleading on damages; they might have produced more evidence on the material 
and non-material damages, including expert opinions; and they might have implored the Court to 
appoint a fact-finding expert of its own, as was done in the Corfu Channel case.81  
V. Implications for Future Efforts at Codifying International Law 
The Court’s jurisprudence has implications well beyond the binding effects upon the 
States that appear before it, especially given the Court’s stature as the judicial organ of the 
United Nations. Although the Court is careful to indicate that its decisions are limited to the facts 
of the cases before it, in a world of limited international jurisprudence it is inevitable that the 
Court’s legal reasoning will impact in new and different ways the development of international 
law. One effect may be seen in the work of the International Law Commission, which pays close 
attention to the Court’s jurisprudence when engaging in the Commission’s mandate to codify and 
progressively develop international law. Three current projects of the Commission may well be 
affected by the Court’s 2012 jurisprudence. 
 First, the Commission is currently studying customary international law on the immunity 
of State officials from the national criminal jurisdiction of another State, a topic that was 
included in the Commission’s agenda in 2007, and is now moving forward under the stewardship 
of Concepción Escobar Hernández (Spain) as Special Rapporteur.82 Earlier decisions of the 
Court are directly relevant to this topic, such as the 2007 judgment in Certain Questions of 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters83 and the 2002 Arrest Warrant judgment,84 but it seems 
likely that the 2012 judgment on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State will also be influential.  
To be sure, the Court was careful in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State to say that it was only 
assessing immunity of a State, not immunity of officials,85 but the Court also repeatedly 
referenced customary international law relating to immunity of officials when construing 
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customary international law relating to immunity of States, thereby suggesting that the two 
bodies of law – if not identical – are at least linked in important ways. As such, one might 
envisage some aspects of the Court’s 2012 judgment affecting the Commission’s approach to 
immunity of officials. 
 For example, as noted above, the Court found that ‘customary international law does not 
treat a State’s entitlement to immunity as dependent upon the gravity of the act of which it is 
accused or the peremptory nature of the rule which it is alleged to have violated.’86 That 
conclusion would seem relevant as well with respect to the immunity of officials.  Indeed, if an 
allegation that the State’s acts violated a norm of jus cogens was not seen as altering a norm on 
State immunity from national jurisdiction because the two norms address different concerns,87 
then it is not readily apparent why the outcome should be different in the context of immunity of 
officials. Part of the Court’s concern appears to have been that a skillful litigant could craft his or 
her allegations as encompassing jus cogens solely to negate State immunity, thereby dragging the 
State into national courts even if the allegations are eventually proved to be spurious.88 That 
same problem presumably exists in the context of foreign officials; indeed, the problem is 
aggravated if during the pendency of the national proceedings the foreign official is incarcerated. 
Some judges in national courts have favored a denial of immunity in the face of grave 
allegations,89 but the practice is by no means uniform.90  
 Likewise, the Court’s assertion that denial of state immunity was inappropriate as a 
remedy of ‘last resort’91 would also seem of relevance in contemplating the availability of 
immunity for foreign government officials. The Court’s methodology in Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State is also of interest in a more general sense; it appears the Court assumed 
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the existence of immunity and then looked for an exception based on settled state practice,92 an 
approach that might also be warranted with respect to immunities of officials. 
Second, since 2005 the Commission has been studying the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare). With the start of the new ILC quinquennium in 2012, the 
Commission decided not to appoint a new special rapporteur but instead to establish a working 
group to consider whether and how to proceed with the topic.93 A key question for the 
Commission is whether there is a well-settled or emergent customary international law norm of 
aut dedere aut judicare and, if so, what is the content of such an obligation and to which crimes 
does it extend? The Commission’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind identified a possible aut dedere aut judicare obligation with respect to genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes,94 but at that time the Commission viewed such an obligation 
as only de lege ferenda. 
In Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, Belgium argued that 
there existed a customary international law obligation of aut dedere aut judicare, which Senegal 
had breached by failing to submit to prosecution or to extradite former Chadian President 
Hissène Habré.95 In support of its position, after prompting by a question from Judge Greenwood 
at the end of the first round of the hearing,96 Belgium placed before the Court certain information 
in support of such a customary norm, including information on the national laws of fifty-one 
states that exercised certain forms of universal jurisdiction.97 For jurisdictional reasons, the Court 
did not address this part of Belgium’s claim, finding that Belgium’s failure to raise this claim in 
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its diplomatic exchanges with Senegal precluded finding that there was a ‘dispute’ between the 
two States, as was necessary to establish the Court’s jurisdiction.98  
Nevertheless, two of the judges addressed this issue in their separate opinions. Judge 
Ronny Abraham asserted that no customary norm obliged Senegal to prosecute Habré in its 
courts, whether for torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide.99 He viewed 
Belgium’s information on national laws as inadequate for various reasons, especially when used 
to support a customary norm related to a crime committed outside the territory of the State 
seeking the extradition, and when neither the alleged offender nor the victims were nationals of 
that State.100 For example, while Belgium had cited to French law in support of a customary 
norm, Judge Abraham asserted that the law of his own State was either treaty-based or enacted as 
a matter of sovereign discretion, not due to a belief that such jurisdiction was required under 
international law (opinio juris).101 Moreover, Judge ad hoc Serge Sur, in his dissenting opinion, 
indicated that the Court’s unwillingness to reach the issue on the merits was driven, inter alia, by 
a concern that no such customary norm existed. He asserted that the jurisdictional finding in part 
was due to a desire ‘to avoid having to find that the customary rule invoked by Belgium did not 
exist, so as not to hinder its possible subsequent establishment in customary law, and thus to 
maintain the uncertainty surrounding this point, pending further developments.’102 If  that view is 
correct, then it may suggest that now is not the time for the Commission to attempt to codify 
such a norm of customary international law. 
  Third, the beginning of this essay discussed the enduring relevance of customary 
international law, and the use of treaties to inform an analysis of custom, in the Court’s 2012 
jurisprudence. The ways in which the Court determined the existence of customary rules and the 
evidence used in support of such rules are directly relevant to the Commission’s current project 
in this area. The Commission decided in the summer of 2012 to add to its agenda the topic 
‘Formation and evidence of customary international law’ under the stewardship of Special 
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Rapporteur Michael Wood (United Kingdom).103 The topic is not focused on the substantive 
rules of customary international law but on how one identifies the existence of such rules. 
Moreover, the Special Rapporteur intends to use the case law of the Court as a central means for 
proceeding with his analysis.104  No doubt the Court’s 2012 jurisprudence will provide ample 
examples for the Commission’s use in the development of this topic.  
VI.         Conclusion 
The decisions issued by the International Court during 2012 were certainly important for 
those appearing before the Court; particular issues were decided that affected specific States and 
persons in concrete ways. Yet, as is always the case, the Court’s jurisprudence has broader 
implications, and will not doubt affect the future disposition of disputes that arise in comparable 
circumstances.105 Moreover, one can discern within this jurisprudence certain broad, cross-
cutting themes; ones that animated the Court’s jurisprudence but might be fairly said to animate 
international law more generally. Notwithstanding the development of treaty regimes across a 
broad array of international law, there remains an enduring relevance of customary international 
law and general principles of law as sources of international law. At the same time, when 
identifying rules of customary international law, there is an enduring attraction to analyzing the 
effects of multilateral treaties in codifying or crystalizing customary rules, rather than relying on 
a classic analysis of the day-to-day practice of States in conjunction with their opinio juris. The 
concept of jus cogens remains a powerful feature of international law, available in theory to 
trump a State’s ability to engage in contrary treaties, yet in practice the concept seems to get little 
traction; certainly, violations of jus cogens have proven unable to open the door to claims before 
national and international tribunals. International law has increasingly become attuned to the 
rights of persons as against the power of States and international organizations, but the 
traditional processes of international law pose difficult and sometimes insurmountable hurdles to 
persons in effectively vindicating those rights.  
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The Court’s jurisprudence highlights areas of international law that are incomplete or 
unsatisfactory. The ICJ’s role is not to legislate solutions in those areas, but the Court’s decisions 
point the direction for changes that might be pursued, either through the development of new 
treaties or institutions or improvements to those that already exist. Thus, policy-makers would do 
well to consider the lessons learned from the Court’s recent jurisprudence in pursuing new 
initiatives for the codification and progressive development of international law.  
 
 
 
 
 
